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Abstract—SCADA, CIS, ICS and similar MODBUS based 
systems were always the target of many types of attacks, but 
during the last decades because of the fast spread of the 
internet, these systems become much more vulnerable. This 
paper is a case study, which aim is to investigate the 
seriousness of the above described situation.  
 
Keywords— attack, Modbus RTU, SCADA, security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
ALKING about smart homes, smart buildings, 
intelligent facilities, internet of things the following 
questions arisen in us. 
1) Is SCADA(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
or similar systems secure enough? 
2) Which part of that systems is the more vulnerable? 
3) Is there any solution to protect the communication 
channel? 
4) If there are vulnerabilities in the communication, is it 
able to cause serious problems? 
5) If it can, how serious is the damage? 
On the next pages we will try to answer these 
questions, but the aim of this case study is not to analyze 
the SCADA or similar systems vulnerabilities part by 
part in detail,   but to investigate one part of it, which part 
is the communication protocol, and search successful or 
unsuccessful attacks against it. In this article, we focus 
on the MODBUS communication protocol because it is a 
widespread communication standard in the particular 
field and 22% of the communication protocols used in 
these types of networks is MODBUS. The paper 
structure is the next. Section II. gives a brief introduction 
about the basic concepts. Section III. descripts the 
MODBUS protocol itself in detail. Section IV presents 
real attacks against SCADA systems and section V. 
stands for the conclusion and  section VI. is for the future 
work.  
II. BASIC CONCEPTS 
For the better understanding in this section we define 
some basic concepts.  
A. CIS 
CIS stands for Critical Infrastructure Systems. Talking 
about CIS means talking about energy generation, 
chemical production, manufacturing, water supplying, 
transportation or any other industrial processes.  
B. ICS 
ICS stands for Industrial Control System. ICS are 
command and control networks and systems designed to 
support industrial processes. According to this definition, 
ICS is the system which purpose is to realize the 
processes of the CIS.   
C. SCADA 
SCADA stands for Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition. SCADA is a special type of ICS. SCADA 
systems usually includes sensors, PLCs (Programmable 
Logic Controller), RTUs (Remote Terminal Unit), and 
HMI (Human-Machine Interface ). SCADA systems 
usually designed to make operation of processes better, 
improve performance, simplify actuation or reduce error 
comes from human intervention. SCADA systems are the 
backbone of most of ICS, it collects, exchanges and 
analyze the system properties, and other relevant data to 
help operate the processes more effectively, both in terms 
of time and materials.   
As you can see the above listed systems are essential 
parts of well-functioning plants, facilities, towns, cities 
or countries, so a successful attack against it affects not 
only the actual SCADA systems but also us.  
D. MODBUS protocol 
The MODBUS protocol was designed by the 
MODICON in the early seventies. MODBUS is a 
network protocol, which primary purpose was to build 
network from PLCs. Through the years it became one of 
the most common communication protocol. There is 
three types of the MODBUS protocol according to the 
messages sending on the channel. 
E. MODBUS TCP 
There are several research dealing with the weaknesses 
of this type of the MODBUS, and although it is not 
typical to use, but several solution exists to protect a 
SCADA system using MODBUS TCP. One of these 
solution is to apply firewalls, proxy servers or SSL. 
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F. MODBUS RTU 
The MODBUS RTU is the serial MODBUS protocol,  
 
 
Fig. 1.  SCADA system of the Building Mechatronics Research Center in University of Debrecen 
 
security, although there are several security breaches in 
it. In Section III. it described in detail. 
G. MODBUD ASCII 
Sending ASCII characters through a communication 
channel is not too widely used solution, so this type of 
MODBUS is not interesting for us in the respect of 
secure SCADA systems. 
III. THE MODBUS SERIAL PROTOCOL 
A. MODBUS serials place in the OSI/ISO model 
The MODBUS serial protocol is a Master-Slave 
protocol, taking place in the Data link layer of the 
OSI/ISO model. It is a request-reply protocol, typically 
one node, the Master, requests the transmission of data 
from the Slave devices. Usually the Slave nodes do not 
initiate the communication with the Master or with other 
Slaves. 
On the seventh layer of the OSI/ISO model the 
MODBUS Application layer provides server-client 
communication. 
On the MODBUS serial line the Masters act as clients 
and the Slaves as servers. 
 
TABLE I 
The ISO/OSI Modell And The Modbus Protocol 
B. The physical layer 
As one of the most widespread serial communication 
protocols, MODBUS serial usually use the 
ANSI/TIA/EIA-485-A-1998 standard (also known as 
RS485) as the physical communication layer. Because 
the Master-Slave hierarchy of the MODBUS protocol, 
the RS485 standard used in half-duplex mode, mainly 
with the two-wire configuration 
C. The Master-Slave principle 
On the MODBUS serial line several Slaves can be 
connected, but only one Master at a time. Every Slave 
must have a unique address, only the Master can 
communicate successfully without it. As the Master 
initiates the communication, the Slave acknowledges the 
request and send back the required data. The Master 
device can issue these requests in either unicast (one 
slave) or broadcast (all slave nodes) modes. Upon 
receiving a broadcast message the Slaves do not send 
reply. 
D. The architecture of the MODBUS serial frame 
The Protocol Data Unit (PDU) of the MODBUS 
protocol is simple and independent from the underlying 
layers. It is composed of a Function code that determines 
the action to be taken with the following Data segment. 
On the serial line the PDU is encapsulated in a frame that 
contains an address field and an error check part. The 
address field in the beginning of the frame is an address 
of a Slave (the target in unicast mode requests, or the 
origin if it is a reply of a slave) and the error check part is 
a CRC or LRC byte pair. 
There are two coding methods to use, the ASCII where 
the data (and the entire frame) is sent in characters, or the 
RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) where the frame is 
composed of hexadecimal characters. The latter is the 
Layer ISO/OSI Model MODBUS 
7 Application MODBUS Application 
protocol 
6 Presentation  
5 Session  
4 Transport  
3 Network  
2 Data Link MODBUS Serial Line 
Protocol 
1 Physical ANSI/TIA/EIA-485-A-1998 
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default, and its data throughput is greater than the ASCII 
method (due to character density).  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Typical Master-Slave configuration on RS485 serial network. Note the resistors. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Architecture of a MODBUS RTU Frame 
 
E. Usage of MODBUS serial 
As the second biggest de facto standard in industrial 
applications (22%, Profibus 28% as of 2010) the 
MODBUS serial protocol is widespread. 
Countless applications are known: 
1)  End point devices: 
a) - Intelligent actuators (motor controllers, 
pumps, valves etc.) 
b) - Sensors (like Radio frequency sensor 
gateways, thermometers, M-bus integrators 
etc.) 
2)  Data acquisition and control devices:  
a) PLCs 
b) Embedded controllers 
3)  On site control, monitoring and data presentation 
devices 
a) Industrial computers  
b)  HMIs and various displays 
4) Servers and databanks 
F. The weaknesses of MODBUS serial 
The most obvious weakness of the MODBUS serial 
protocol is the lack of built in security measures. There is 
no means of identifying a device on the bus, if we do not 
anticipate its presence. There is no built in command to 
discover connected devices or to verify their authenticity. 
And foremost the Master nodes do not have to have 
address, and can communicate over the bus without one.  
Another weakness is that the messages transmit over 
the medium without any encryption, in a simple and clear 
text format and can be read without decoding. 
In an imagined scenario, if an attacker successfully 
insert a transceiver device between two nodes, it can 
monitor, disrupt and modify the communication or 
compromise it entirely. 
So, we can declare -without any detailed analysis of 
the protocol- that several serious security breaches found 
in the communication through MODBUS. 
 
Fig. 4.  A compromised MODBUS network topology 
IV. SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS 
A. Attack against MODBUS/TCP protocol based 
systems 
1) 1982 
In 1982 a part of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline 
destroyed because of a Trojan virus got into its SCADA 
system. The explosion was equivalent with a three 
kilotons of TNT. 
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2) 2003 
In 2003 a US hydroelectric power plant decoy system 
lost all control because of a hacker group called APT1 
[1]. 
In 2003 seven American states needed the work 
properly without electricity because of a malware 
destroyed some CIS. The blackout caused many damage, 
among other serious things, people died because of it [3]. 
3) 2013 
In 2013 two American cyber security experts took 
over the control of an oil rig. It could have been cause 
serious environmental disaster [2]. 
The above listed events only a tiny part of the known 
attacks, and most of them happened because these 
SCADA, CIS and ICS had somehow linked to the 
internet. Several publications and researches investigate 
the vulnerabilities of internet linked SCADA systems, or 
in other words MODBUS TCP based SCADA systems – 
as it mentioned before -, and of course several solution 
exists. Nevertheless these solution focus on to protect 
SCADA systems from attacker who come from the 
internet. 
B. Attack against MODBUS RTU protocol based 
systems 
1) 2010 
From 2010 a malware called Stuxnet systematically 
destroyed a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges by causing 
them to spin out of control. When the malware installed 
on a SCADA system it is able to access, read, write, and 
delete code blocks on the PLCs. It infects USB drives, 
and then spread like a common flu, that is why the 
solutions that secure against MODBUS/TCP did not 
work in this particular case [4]. 
2) 2011 
In 2011 McAfee reported that several of its customers 
(corporations in the energy sector) got hit by a series of 
attacks from Chinese origin. The primary goal of the 
attacks was not to cause damage, but to gather 
information on the affected companies SCADA network 
structure (and possible exploitable weaknesses) [5]. 
3) 2013 
In 2013 two ICS expert compromised multiple 
industrial facilities through radio frequency channel. 
They took access over temperature sensors, and was able 
to falsify the real data [7]. 
The ICS-CERT (Industrial Control Systems Cyber 
Emergency Response Team) monitoring report of 2013 
states that in the first half of that year they discerned 
more than 200 attacks that targeted ICS systems [6, 8]. 
In their 2013 presentation at the 30
th
 Chaos 
Communication Congress, the SCADA Strangelove team 
reported their findings about the vulnerabilities of several 
industrial protocols including MODBUS. They exploited 
“zero day” bugs and took over entire networks within the 
matter of hours. When a viewer asked after the 
presentation if the team could take over nuclear plants or 
similar networks the presenters stated: “It would be better 
to answer that question backstage, in private.” 
V. CONCLUSION  
We come to the point to answer the questions of the 
introduction section. The answer for the first question is 
clearly no, we can say it because in the previous section 
lot of successful attacks were presented, and these cases 
are only the top of the iceberg. Answering to the second 
question in the absence of a thorough investigation may 
seem to be guesswork, but it can be said that every 
system – consisting any types of devices - depends on the 
underlying communication channel. That is the reason, 
why we choose the MODBUS protocol as the main topic 
of the case study. As you can read in the previous 
sections there are several possible solution to make 
MODBUS PLC communication more secure, but there 
are not any solution (or not cryptographically secure 
solution) for MODBUS RTU. MODBUS communication 
protocols are backbones of SCADA and CIS systems, 
which responsible for critical tasks, so ruin such systems 
can cause not only enormous material damage, but can 
costs lives. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
After investigating these cases we can say, that a 
proper solution is needed to make communication over 
MODBUS RTU secure, and make SCADA systems more 
reliable, from this point of view too. In the next months 
we plan to design a secure and cryptographically correct 
communication protocol on the MODBUS RTU standard 
and implement on AVR microcontrollers. 
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